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Abstract: This paper asks how criminologists can understand the experiences of others and 
how phenomenology might contribute to this understanding. To answer these questions I 
explicate two phenomenological traditions – transcendental phenomenology and existential 
phenomenology – and consider previous work on the phenomenology of violence. I critically 
evaluate claims that phenomenology cannot account for others‟ experiences. On the one 
hand, I sympathize with Levinasian-inspired arguments that phenomenology oftentimes 
accounts for others‟ experiences by dissolving difference and interpreting the other‟s 
experience as the same as ones‟ own. I argue that much of the scholarship on the 
phenomenology of violence is guilty of this charge. On the other hand, I demonstrate that 
these criticisms result largely from misaligned methodologies and apply most directly to 
those (mainly Schutzian) phenomenologies that aim for apodictic certainty and utilize ideal-
typical analysis, ignore temporality, employ non-participatory methods, and ignore 
researcher reflexivity. I further contend that writing off all phenomenology as unable to 
account for the different experiences of “the other” risks overstating those differences and 
potentially leads to an indifference that would undercut research and ethical engagement 
with others. Instead of viewing others as either the same or wholly other, I couple certain 
phenomenological conclusions with central themes in Merleau-Ponty‟s work to sketch a 
research program and ethical practice that can aid in understanding others‟ experiences as 
both similar and different. I summarize this approach as “sharing”. 
Key words: 
Phenomenology, Ethics, Methodology, Violence, Understanding, Alterity Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
2011 Special Edition Vol. 1: 1-42     
2 
 
 
  How can we understand the everyday lives of those we study in criminology? 
Although the difficulties of capturing and analyzing another person‟s lived experiences are 
not unique to criminology, the gaps between the worlds of the criminological scholar and the 
officers, victims, or offenders he or she studies seem particularly broad. How, if at all, can 
we bridge these gaps? Ought we to seek such a bridging? If so, to what degree and how 
might this be possible? 
These questions concern a longstanding debate about understanding “the other” as 
an experiencing individual. By stressing everyday experience, these questions contend that 
peoples‟ lived realities contain more than what the statistical or textual data used in most 
criminological research convey (see Katz, 1988, 2002; Ferrell 2004, 2009). Although 
statistics and texts are important means individuals employ to represent and guide some 
actions, many activities remain beyond linguistic and numerical transcription. Of all the 
philosophical perspectives, phenomenology most explicitly claims to tap this broader 
experiential realm. Yet phenomenology has faced some severe critiques concerning its 
ability to tap other‟s experiences and the ethics of so doing. In this paper I take up these 
debates: I question what, if anything, phenomenology has to offer criminology‟s 
understanding of others. 
Argument and approach 
My response to this question involves explicating two phenomenological traditions: 
(i) the transcendental phenomenology created by Edmund Husserl and applied to the social 
world by Alfred Schutz, and (ii) the existential phenomenology found in authors like Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On the one hand, I sympathize with arguments that 
phenomenology largely accounts for others‟ experiences by violently interpreting them as 
the same as ones‟ own (Levinas, 1969, 1985). I argue that this charge resonates with 
scholarship on the phenomenology of violence. On the other hand, I argue that these 
criticisms apply most directly to (mainly Schutzian) phenomenologies that aim for apodictic Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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certainty and utilize ideal types, ignore temporality, proceed by indirect (non-participatory) 
methodologies, and ignore researcher reflexivity. Further, following Jack Reynolds (2004), I 
contend that writing off all phenomenology as unable to account for the different 
experiences of “the other” risks overstating those differences and thereby undercuts ethical 
engagement and research with others. Instead of viewing others as either the same or 
wholly-other, I stress particular conclusions of Merleau-Ponty‟s phenomenology in order to 
sketch the tenets of a possible research program and ethical practice that can aid in 
understanding others‟ experiences as both similar and different. I summarize this practice 
as “sharing”; it emphasizes working together longitudinally in a shared lifeworld to arrive at 
a partial understanding of one another that allows for ambiguity and difference, while 
simultaneously recognizing similarity and necessitating mutual change.  
  These arguments unfold in three parts. First, I describe the phenomenological camps 
that concern this paper and outline some existing critiques. Second, I overview attempts to 
apply phenomenology to the topic of violence. I use these examples to give the discussion 
more criminological relevance and to demonstrate some difficulties involved in 
phenomenological analyses of intersubjective activities. Third, I attempt to learn from these 
challenges and argue against a wholesale rejection of phenomenology. Here I sketch an 
alternative practice for understanding “the other” that retains certain phenomenological 
conclusions about the shared lifeworld and utilizes many elements of Merleau-Ponty‟s 
phenomenology. I then briefly contrast the nuances of this approach to the previous 
phenomenologies of violence and to similar approaches in cultural criminology.  
 
Experience and phenomenology 
Husserl and Schutz: Experience and consciousness 
  Many authors credit Husserl as the founder of phenomenology (Moran, 2005; 
Psathas, 1989; Schutz, 1967, 1971). Husserl‟s (1982) driving concern was that scientific 
and everyday practices take the things around them for granted or conceive of them Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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according to causal accounts that place the understanding of the thing outside of the thing 
itself. In place of this “natural attitude,” Husserl (1982) argued that in order to secure 
proper foundations for understanding we needed to return “back to the things themselves.” 
Husserl‟s aim, then, was to reflect on how our consciousness grasps individual objects 
(Long, 1979; Russell, 2006; Moran, 2005). Husserl (1982, p. 20) termed the modus 
operandi for arriving at the thing itself the “phenomenological epoché.” This method 
involves suspending or bracketing the natural attitude in order to bring one‟s conscious 
experience to the forefront of reflection. In this process, one doubts all prior understanding 
of an object and describes both (i) the object as one‟s consciousness experiences it and (ii) 
the conscious operations used to experience the object.  
Husserl (1982) makes great efforts to emphasize that doubting the natural attitude 
is not nihilistic skepticism. The phenomenological epoché does not doubt that things exist. 
Rather the existence of things external to the mind is simply taken for granted (Polizzi, 
2010; Schutz, 1967) and the phenomenological task is to unpack how these things present 
themselves as phenomenon to one‟s consciousness (Husserl, 1982, p. 20). Therefore, unlike 
Rene Descartes‟ (1952) “cogito ergo sum”, which gives one certainty only of oneself as a 
thinking being, Husserl‟s position is that the phenomenological epoché demonstrates that 
we are beings experiencing other things. Consciousness, for Husserl (1982, p.33), is always 
“consciousness of something.” Therefore, the doubting and reflexive attitude demonstrates 
the existence of both an experiencing subject and things experienced.  
Husserl (1982, p.33) used the term “intentionality” to describe the relation between 
the conscious subject and the object of consciousness (see also Dreyfus, 1993; Polizzi, 
2010; Psathas, 1989). Intentionality describes the particular conscious act (e.g., perceiving, 
remembering, wishing, etc.) by which we direct our attention toward an object. This 
intentional act (i) selects an object in the world from the flow of experience and brings it 
into consciousness (Russell, 2006; Schutz, 1967) and (ii) constitutes the object insofar as it 
imbues the object with specific qualities, characteristics, and meanings (Polizzi, 2010). Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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Intentionality orients the person to an object in a specific way and so carries an 
“interpretive sense” or “meaning-context” that is dependent on the person‟s particular 
perspective and the temporal referent with which he or she views the object – e.g., if the 
individual imagined the object in the context of a future project or if the individual 
remember the object in the context of a completed act (Russell, 2006; Schutz, 1967). 
Consequently, the same object can be given different interpretations because its meaning is 
dependent on the type of act in which the object was intended (Russell, 2006, p. 85; Polizzi, 
2010).  
Husserl (1982), however, often sought to provide a stable grounding for the sciences 
within consciousness (see Marion, 1998, ch. 1), and so further argued that these different 
interpretations could be overcome to arrive at a certain essential understanding of the thing 
itself. He argued that phenomenological reflection allowed consideration of prior cognitive 
processes which could be synthesized to “intuitively grasp” the unchanging characteristics of 
an object uncovered in each situated intentional act. That is, according to Husserl (1982, 
esp. mediation 4), one can grasp the central characteristics of an object through an “eidetic 
method” whereby one considers all the variations of an object experienced in prior 
perceptions, imaginings, and remembrances, and  then determines what remains constant 
throughout these previous cognitions. This constant is the element without which the object 
of consciousness would cease to be experienced in any fashion; it is its essential structure 
(Russell, 2006; Psathas, 1989).  
Husserl (1982, p. 41) also demonstrated that this understanding of objects unfolds in 
“internal time” whereby, based on prior experiences, we anticipate an object as having 
certain characteristics and then find that anticipation given in full “evidence” as it is fulfilled 
in current experience (see also Best, 1975, Schutz, 1967). This temporal character reveals 
that our experiences meld into a unified stream, the individual ego (Husserl, 1982, p. 66). 
Phenomenological description thus demonstrates how we experience an exterior objects‟ 
essence as immanent to our consciousness. As Jean-Luc Marion (1998, ch. 1) and Hubert Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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Dreyfus (1993) explain, Husserl‟s account of phenomenon is largely mentalistic. For Husserl, 
phenomenon are only those things given under the gaze of consciousness (Marion, 1998, 
ch. 1) and action requires a cognitive intentionality wherein a person must represent the 
goal of the action to themselves to complete the activity (Dreyfus, 1993). 
This approach gives a detailed and intriguing description of a single reflexive 
individual‟s experience, but does not yet address our concern with understanding another 
person‟s experiences. Husserl (1982, esp. meditation 5) extends his phenomenology beyond 
the individual ego to an intersubjective realm. He argues that consciousness not only 
experiences transcendent objects but also experiences other individuals. Husserl (1982, p. 
109) notes that the limits of human consciousness mean that “neither the other Ego 
himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else 
belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally” - this is precisely 
what demonstrates that the other individual is in fact an other and not one‟s self (Russell, 
2006, p. 173). Nonetheless, we do observe the bodies of others and can use our self-
awareness of our own embodiment “as the motivational basis for the “analogizing” 
apprehension of [an other‟s] body as another animate organism” (Husserl, 1982, p. 111). In 
other words, the other‟s body appresents the awareness that, like one‟s own body, it is not 
simply an object but contains an intentional consciousness capable of manipulating objects 
in the world. We can therefore conclude that “the other” is like ourselves and that we are 
like “the other” (see also Schutz, 1967, p. 101). Moreover, each consciousness, according to 
Husserl (1982, p. 129), exists “in an intentional community” with other persons (see also 
Russell, 2006; Polizzi, 2010). Through these intentional relations with other individuals the 
objective existence of the objects of our consciousness and the meaning we give to our 
experiences of them is confirmed. As Matheson Russell (2006, p. 165) explains, “A solitary 
ego‟s intentional arc can provide „evidence‟…but an object can only be posited as a really 
transcendent Object thanks to the mediated experience of that object as also given 
„evidently‟ to others.”  On the basis of this formulation of intersubjectivity, Husserl (1982) Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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concludes that the phenomenological epoché reveals both one‟s own and others‟ experience 
of a common world; there necessarily exists, in Husserl‟s opinion, both transcendent objects 
and a transcendent ego (Long, 1979; Russell, 2006, ch. 10).  
Social scientists influenced by Husserl have made reflecting on life in the everyday 
“natural attitude” and intersubjective realm, not on consciousness narrowed by the 
phenomenological epoché, their primary task (e.g., Schutz, 1964, 1967, 1971). According 
to Schutz (1967), in this natural attitude persons do not aspire to apodictic certainty 
through eidetic analysis, but simply to an understanding that is sufficient to pragmatic ends. 
As such, in everyday life persons intend toward an object or another individual at any 
moment with a singular intentional act that considers others‟ interpretations and presence in 
the shared lifeworld (Schutz, 1967; see also Polizzi, 2010). Singular intentional acts, unlike 
eidetic analysis, cannot fully perceive an object from all of its possible perspectives and 
moments (see Marion, 1998). Rather, the situated-singularity of an intentional act explains 
why persons can give different accounts of the same thing and demonstrates that the world 
is “always open to multiple interpretations that are not exclusive to any single perceiving 
subject” (Polizzi, 2010, p. 7). The central task, then, is to explicate how coherently 
meaningful action is created in reference to, and in conjunction with, those who 
intersubjectively shape the person‟s lifeworld (see also Crotty, 1998, ch. 4). 
  Schutz (1964, 1967) attempted to explain social action and intersubjective meaning 
constitution by following Husserl‟s conclusion that intentionality drove humans‟ conscious 
experiences. Schutz argued that mutual understanding was a constantly negotiated 
achievement between persons (Katz, 2002), not a transcendent property of intersubjectivity 
as Husserl argued. According to Schutz (1967), mutual understanding unfolded as persons 
oriented pragmatically to their everyday world as projects imagined in Husserlian “inner 
time.” Schutz (1964, 1967) argued that persons pursue these projects through interaction 
wherein an individual‟s actions would cause other persons to act in ways that would aid in 
achieving the desired end. In his language, one person‟s “in-order-to motives” would Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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become another‟s “because motives,” and vice versa, in a process whereby parties arrive at 
a mutual understanding and engage in individual intentional projects. Understanding the 
experience of another person or a group of interacting others, then, requires a grasp of the 
motives that form their intentional acts and meaning-contexts (Schutz, 1964, 1967).  
  Schutz (1967) was very aware that grasping the inner motive of another person 
presented significant difficulties and he sought to give a detailed explanation of how this 
understanding was possible. For Schutz (1967), a central problem was that in order to know 
the intended meaning another person imparts on experience in everyday life, one must 
know the epistemic attitude and temporal reference with which the actor views the 
experience. That is, we must know from what perspective actors situate their intentional 
act. We must also determine whether the behaviour they are exhibiting is in fact guided by 
a conscious goal (an in-order-to motive) or seen as a conscious response to prior actions (a 
genuine because motive). Further complicating this determination is the fact that the 
temporality of experience and reflection means that the situated meaning changes over 
time – thus one‟s in-order-to motives are later seen as because motives and the relevant 
meaning-context shifts. We must, then, know the entire unfolding temporal project of the 
other.  
Following Husserl, Schutz (1967, p. 99; 1971, p. 134) argued that this required 
knowledge is not directly accessible since it is necessarily confined in the other‟s 
consciousness. However, Schutz (1967) did not feel that observation of the other‟s body 
was enough to determine, with adequate certainty, the inner conscious state of another. 
Schutz (1967, ch. 1) noted the limits of observation as a means of understanding; for a 
person could appear to be doing one thing (e.g., aiming a riffle to shoot) when in fact they 
had another goal in mind when completing the action (e.g., simply looking at an individual 
through the scope). Schutz (1967) concluded, then, that observation and self-reflection on 
one‟s own experience of the other only gives us the objective content of meaning. We must, 
instead, observe the other‟s actions and place them into a larger context of meaning that Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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includes the individual‟s subjective perspective. In accurately determining this subjective 
meaning-context, the type of social relationship one has with the other – what Schutz 
(1967, ch. 4) calls the structure of the social world – plays a determinate role. Schutz 
(1971, p. 134) observed that interactions contained “various degrees of intimacy and 
anonymity” that determined our level of “familiarity and strangeness” with others‟ 
behaviour. Our understanding of another person, then, changes form depending on the level 
of givenness of the other.  
Schutz (1967) divided our relationship to others into four levels: consociates (those 
we share a common perceptual field and can interact with), contemporaries (those we share 
a temporal existence with), successors (those who will come after us), and predecessors 
(those who came before us). According to Schutz (1967, 1971, p. 134), we are in a better 
position to understand consociates‟ lives because we directly share a lifeworld with them. 
These “we-relationships” enable “genuine understanding” of the other because the parties 
involved exist within one another‟s subjective meaning-contexts. Through social interaction 
with one another our consciousnesses become simultaneously unfolding and we can seek 
verification of one another‟s meaning (Schutz, 1967, ch. 4; Walsh, 1967, p. xxv). The realm 
of contemporaries, on the other hand, entails significant spatial distancing which precludes 
direct participation and necessitates indirect knowledge. Consequently, our basis of 
understanding transforms such that we must resort to inferential processes and ideal typical 
analyses. In such analyses we view the other in terms of an anonymous actor and assume 
that either (i) the other‟s meaning-context would be the same as our own if we were in the 
situation, (ii) the other‟s completed act serves as the inherent goal and thus the other‟s in-
order-to motive, or (iii) the other‟s meaning-context (i.e. motive) resembles that 
customarily held by persons we are familiar with and who have been in that situation. In the 
realm of predecessors we are further disadvantage in that we do not share a temporal 
similarity. Consequently, our ideal types must assume that the past context is the same as 
the one we have come to experience, or they must be informed by what we know generally Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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about the historical context and the typical people therein. We are disadvantaged still more 
when it comes to the realm of successors for we have no knowledge of what the future will 
be like and so our ideal types must be based on the assumption that the future will remain 
the same. When our goal is to understand social action among two or more persons, these 
same different bases of understanding apply depending on our relationship to each person 
involved (Schutz, 1967, ch. 4).  
  While Schutz (1967) showed direct participation to be essential to all understanding 
of other persons, he (1964, 1969, 1971) did not feel that ideal typical analysis was a 
significant problem. Ideal-typical analyses simply reflected a limitation imposed by the 
structure of the social world. In fact, according to Schutz (1967, p. 223), proper social 
scientific understanding operated through ideal-types because social science always 
involved understanding contemporaries through indirect knowledge. Scientific rigor, 
however, demanded that a social scientist‟s ideal types demonstrate (i) meaning-adequacy 
that confirms the subjective meaning-context assumed of the actor is likely accurate 
insomuch as it does not contradict what is known about the actor and others in general, and 
(ii) causal adequacy insofar as the meanings attributed to actors are logically consistent and 
do not contradict established scientific conclusions (Schutz, 1967, ch. 5; see also Best, 
1975). Consequently, the proper purview of social science was instrumentally rational action 
that could be easily viewed in terms of typical motives (Schutz, 1967, ch. 5).  
Heidegger’s existential turn: Being-in-the-world and phenomenology beyond consciousness  
  Heidegger (1962) similarly followed Husserl‟s conclusions into everyday life. 
However, instead of investigating cognitive intentional acts within the natural attitude, 
Heidegger took Husserl‟s demonstration of the givenness of phenomenon as a starting place 
for ontological investigation (Marion, 1998, ch. 2). That is, rather than reflecting on the 
nature of beings (individual objects), Heidegger sought to think phenomenologically about 
the experience of phenomenality – or Being – itself (Marion, 1998, ch, 2; Polizzi, 2010; 
Werkmeister, 1941). In so doing, Heidegger does not reduce phenomenon to consciousness Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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(Marion, 1998, ch, 2; Dreyfus, 1993). In fact, Heidegger (1962) demonstrates that 
everyday existence largely involves absorbed coping with the world around us. Within this 
mode of existence individuals can act without having a mental representation of the purpose 
or goal of the action; although action remains guided by intentionality in the sense that it 
involves an embodied person responding pre-reflexively to the situation. Intentionality is 
thus released from its cognitive moorings and made more practical, allowing the doing -- 
not simply thinking -- subject to emerge (Dreyfus, 1993; Werkmeister, 1941).  
According to Heidegger (1962), then, if we do not bracket out the world through the 
phenomenological epoché we find our lives involve a being-in-the-world (Dasein) that 
experiences subjects and objects as indistinguishable and acts pre-reflexively in response to 
a world already familiar (Dreyfus, 1993; Werkmeister, 1941). Consequently, the ontological 
question of being-as-such can only be understood in terms of one‟s interaction with the 
social world. This world is something that we are always-already thrown into; it comes with 
pre-existing relations and expectations that guide our interpretations and actions. Being-in-
the-world, then, is intersubjectively determined. While there is room for creativity and 
choice in how Dasein orients its existence, each person exists in particular “they-self” 
relations which enable actions to be given some element of shared meaning. Our 
experiences and understanding are therefore always worked out in relation with others from 
a specific socio-historical context. In working through these interactions we continually 
make sense of ourselves and our world as ongoing, never-complete, projects that orient our 
existence (Polizzi, 2010). Understanding others, then, requires an awareness that 
individuals can act pre-reflexively and are continually attempting to form an identity that 
imbues the entire world with meaning.  
Merleau-Ponty: Ambiguous experience of body-subjects 
  Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002, 2004) work both extends and criticizes the phenomenologies 
of Husserl and Heidegger. Like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. ix) sought to reflect on our 
experience of “things themselves” without reference to exterior causes. To do so, however, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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Merleau-Ponty advanced phenomenology‟s brief foray into embodiment. Merleau-Ponty‟s 
central argument was that our embodiment structures our perceptual and reflective 
experience (Baldwin, 2004). Extending Heidegger‟s “nonementalistic phenomenology of 
perception” (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 26), Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002) account of experience 
maintained that we are our bodies and that the mind and body are one. The body is not a 
separate object of reflection, but a tool we use to perceive and act in the world (see also 
Reynolds, 2004). In many cases these actions are, as Heidegger demonstrated, pre-
reflexive bodily reactions to the situations that appear before us. Merleau-Ponty (2002, pp. 
164-168) termed these automatic and non-cognitive processes “habits.” Habit “gives our life 
the form of generality and prolongs our personal acts into stable dispositions” (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002, p. 146). Yet, at the same time, Merleau-Ponty left room for interpretation and 
creativity in human action through what he called the “creative receptivity” of perception 
(Reynolds, 2004). As such, our relation to the world is one of “I can” and not “I think”; we 
relate to the world through what our bodies can do with objects in the world and through 
the sensory data those objects impart on our bodies (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 137).  
  For Merleau-Ponty (2002), experience is much more ambiguous than Husserl‟s 
(1982) or Schutz‟s (1964, 1967, 1971) reflective accounts attest. Our pre-reflexive habitual 
experiences deny that we perceive things at one moment, interpret them the next, and then 
decide the correct course of action. Instead, according to Merleau-Ponty (2002), our actions 
have a collapsed temporality where past and future conjoin in the present. That is, the 
cognitive processes accompanying pre-reflexive (yet intentional) acts often unfold 
simultaneously, not sequentially (Reynolds, 2004).  
Merleau-Ponty (2002) further argues that a similar ambiguity haunts the very project 
of phenomenological reflection. He suggests that we cannot easily bracket certain objects 
from the flow of experience to make them the object of reflection. On the contrary, for 
Merleau-Ponty, every attempt at reduction is incomplete as perception occurs within an 
ambiguous context of foreground and background. We only perceive an object in relation to Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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its background. Similar to Heidegger‟s (1962) position, the background is a context that 
shapes our perception of the thing itself and is not something we can simply forget. 
Moreover, our body‟s motility means that we often perceive an object from ever-changing 
vantage points which then constitute new and fluid relations between foreground and 
background. Our perceptual experience, then, is not a holistic encompassment of all objects 
in relation to a singular horizonal viewpoint, but an overlapping engagement with singular 
objects against a background that somehow forms these various perceptions into one world. 
How this occurs is not immediately clear to people in their everyday lives (Baldwin, 2004; 
Merleau-Ponty, 2004). Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty (2002) asserts that although the 
ambiguity of perception means that we can never have certainty “of anything in particular,”  
“[t]here is the absolute certitude of the world in general” (p. 344).  
Merleau-Ponty (2002) also agreed with Heidegger‟s (1962) dissolution of the subject-
object distinction. However, he further situated this ambiguity between subject and object 
within embodied pre-reflexive practice. Specifically, when we are acting pre-reflexively and 
our bodies are automatically responding to the situation before us, there is, Merleau-Ponty 
argues, a reversibility or intertwining between subject and object. The person and the 
worldly situation they find themselves in become indistinct and mutually constituting 
(Reynolds, 2004). This ambiguity between subject and object is also apparent in our 
reflexive actions. Merleau-Ponty (2002) demonstrates that when we reflect on sensory 
experience, like touching, there is an ambiguity as to what is the subject, that doing the 
touching, and what is the object, the thing touched. Merleau-Ponty does not try to resolve 
this distinction. Instead, he concludes that our sensory perception makes our bodies both 
subject and object. Finally, Merleau-Ponty‟s analysis of illusions also demonstrates the 
ambiguity between the boundaries of individual perception. The illusions Merleau-Ponty 
discusses demonstrate that “what we literally see or notice is…not simply the objective 
world, but is conditioned by a myriad of factors that ensures the relationship between 
perceiving subject and the object perceived is not one of exclusion. Rather each term exists Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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only through its dialectical relation to the other” (Reynolds, 2004, p. 9). Merleau-Ponty 
(2002, p. 407) therefore concludes “inside and outside are inseparable. The world is wholly 
inside and I am wholly outside myself.” Throughout his philosophy, Merleau-Ponty uses the 
term “body-subject” to emphasize this ambiguity between body and mind, self and object 
(Reynolds, 2004).  
  This ambiguity between subject and object has deep implications for Merleau-Ponty‟s 
analysis of intersubjectivity and our understanding of others. His opinion, like Husserl‟s 
(1982), was that our perception of others is enough to assure ourselves of their existence 
as other body-subjects. We can know people, according to Merleau-Ponty (2002; 2004), by 
our perceptions of their behaviour, which they manifest on their bodies through action and 
speech (see also Baldwin, 2004; Reynolds, 2004). Additionally, Merleau-Ponty‟s idea of 
intersubjectivity held that we are aware of ourselves only through our awareness of others‟ 
behaviour and speech. We do not fully perceive ourselves, and so it is through the other 
that we obtain self-awareness. Moreover, our bodies respond to the world and in responding 
to others we constitute our individual selves (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 122). In this process 
of mutual constitution, self and other intertwine. Within this intertwining both parties learn 
the specific cultural patterns, bodily habits and common language required to continue 
interaction (see also Baldwin, 2004; Reynolds, 2004).  
We see here, then, the same basic phenomenological conclusion that the world is 
experienced and made meaningful from a particular perspective that is shaped by its 
relations with others. Of course, this is not to say that seeing the other and sharing a world 
with them equals being them and understanding them fully. Our embodiment and 
perceptual ambiguity preclude such certainty. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty‟s point is that the 
other is not inaccessible, but is part of the self and the world the body-subject moves 
within. As Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. xiii) succinctly summarized, “the Alter and the Ego are 
one and the same in the true world which is the unifier of minds” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 
xiii). “In reality, the other is not shut up inside my perspective of the world, because this Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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perspective itself has no definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the other‟s, and 
because both are brought together in the one single world in which we all participate as 
anonymous subjects of perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 411). 
Criticism of phenomenology: “Imperialism of the same” 
  As a reflection on experience in and of itself, phenomenology adequately deals with 
one element of our question about understanding others‟ experiences. However, the most 
vocal criticisms of phenomenology revolve around its ideas of intersubjectivity and its claims 
to understand others. That is, although phenomenology reflects on experience, many argue 
that it leaves much to be desired when it comes to understanding others‟ experience. Critics 
often claim phenomenology is solipsistic: only able to account for the experiences of the 
individual doing the reflection (e.g., Best, 1975; Levinas, 1969, 1985; Pivcevic, 1972). 
However, these charges assume that phenomenology demands an understanding of the 
other that could access the others‟ consciousness. None of the above phenomenologists 
make this claim. Rather, each concludes that reflection demonstrates there is an external 
reality that presents itself to the self‟s consciousness and reveals a shared world containing 
subjects (others) with similar embodied and conscious capabilities.  
  Critics like Emmanuel Levinas (1985, 1969), however, further argue 
phenomenology‟s ability to grasp the other always occurs through its reduction of the other 
to an entity that is the same as one‟s self. According to Levinas (1985) and Ron Best 
(1975), this is evident in Husserl‟s (1982) account of the other as, by analogy, like the self. 
Edo Pivcevic (1972) argues Schutz‟s (1964, 1967) use of “typical” models to understand 
behaviour similarly reduces any person to what one would expect that person to do based 
on one‟s own experiences (see also Long, 1979). Levinas even argues that Merleau-Ponty‟s 
transfer of one‟s experience of the ambiguity between sentient and sensible to the 
experience of another person reduces the other to the same (see Reynolds, 2004). Although 
I will return to this question of similarity below, especially as it relates to Merleau-Ponty‟s 
work, it is obvious that the main critique of phenomenology is its possible transfer of one‟s Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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own experience onto the other. According to Levinas (1969, 1985), this form of analysis 
means that others exist only insofar as they are not other, but the same as one‟s self. This 
leads to the dissolution of the otherness of the other, and what Levinas calls an “imperialism 
of the same” (Levinas, 1969; see Reynolds, 2004). Critics like Levinas argue that the proper 
and ethical thing to do when encountering the other is resist viewing them as one‟s self and 
respect their complete alterity (see Derrida, 1995; Couzens-Hoy, 2005; Dutta, 2004).  
Phenomenology applied: Violence 
Violence 
  The above review of how phenomenology accounts, or does not account, for the 
experiences of oneself and others is admittedly abstract. To clarify and to demonstrate the 
difficulties of applying phenomenology to intersubjective criminological problems I offer a 
summary of some of the literature that claims to approach violence from a 
phenomenological perspective. Violence is a particularly apposite topic to review here 
because it has criminological relevance, is intersubjective, and, under the auspices of 
cultural criminology, is witnessing renewed attempts to analyze it using a phenomenological 
framework (e.g., Jackson-Jacobs, 2004; Lyng, 2004). Three general themes guide the five 
studies that I will review here: violence as interaction, violence as an emotional existential 
project, and embodiment. After reviewing these studies, I will reflect on what these 
applications of phenomenology demonstrate about phenomenology‟s ability to explain 
others‟ experiences.  
Denzin and Jackson-Jacobs: Violent interaction 
  Norman Denzin‟s (1984) work on domestic violence marks an early attempt to apply 
phenomenology to interpersonal violence, while Curtis Jackson-Jacobs‟s (2004) work 
provides a more recent effort at a “dramaturgical phenomenology of street brawling as 
collective action” (Ferrell, Hayward, Morrison & Presdee, 2004, pp. 6-7). Although both are 
looking at violence in radically different settings, both view violence as “situated, 
interpersonal, emotional, and cognitive activity” (Denzin, 1984, p. 484).  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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Denzin (1984, p. 485) describes his method as “phenomenological, dialectical, 
interpretive, and interactionist.” He primarily uses previous literature “to examine the 
phenomenon of domestic violence from within, as lived experience” (Denzin, 1984, p. 485).  
His main argument is that domestic violence unfolds according to a process of self-
destructing “negative symbolic interaction.” He argues that domestic violence erupts when a 
family member disappoints the cultural expectation that men are the dominant household 
figures. For Denzin (1984, p. 487), although economic, legal, and cultural processes 
structure violence, what is important is that violence‟s meaning is “filtered and woven 
through the lives of interacting individuals.”  
Violence‟s meaning, then, unfolds as an intentional project between parties. Denzin 
(1984) argues that for the perpetrator of domestic violence, the man, violence is an attempt 
to use physical or emotional force to regain hegemonic status and the respect of other 
family members. The perpetrator interprets the actions of the victim as an attack to his 
identity and thus as a cause of his violence. In turn the violent actor is overcome with 
emotional rage and suspends the moral value of the victim. This justifies the intent to harm 
and narrows any alternative views of the situation (Denzin, 1984, pp. 500-501). Violence 
therefore imposes one interpretive framework and destroys the victim‟s interpretive 
framework. In so doing it can temporarily achieve its desired end of control over the other. 
However, Denzin suggests that this rupture leads victims to view the act and the 
perpetrator negatively; the violent act cannot permanently impart the interpretation of 
control and respect that the perpetrator aims at. Consequently, the violence destroys the 
very respect and control it seeks to attain and leads to a self-perpetuating violent spiral. As 
Denzin (1984, p. 484) writes of the perpetrator‟s experience:   
He has the flesh of the other in his grip, while the other‟s will and freedom slips from 
his grasp. The goal of the violent act eludes the man of violence. He is drawn over 
and over again into the cycle of violence. He can never succeed in establishing his 
dominance and will over the will of the other. 
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  Denzin (1984, pp. 490-491) further argues that household members experience the 
cycle of violence along the following pathway:  
(1) denial of the violence; (2) pleasure derived from violence; (3) the building of 
mutual hostility between spouses and other family members; (4) the development of 
misunderstandings; (5) jealousy, especially sexual; (6) increased violence; and 
either (7) eventual collapse of the system or (8) resolution of violence into an 
unsteady, yet somewhat stable state of recurring violence.  
 
Denzin concludes from his phenomenology of domestic violence, that violent interaction 
necessarily sets this cyclical pattern in motion and that the only means of breaking free 
from domestic violence is to remove oneself from the situation and begin a process of self-
restructuring.  
Like Denzin (1984), Jackson-Jacobs‟ (2004) account of violence presents it as an 
intentional pragmatic act. Jackson-Jacob describes his approach as inspired by symbolic 
interactionism and phenomenological sociologies which aim to give situated and descriptive 
explanations of why people do things. He describes his overall project as relying on 
observation and interviews to “trace the experience of participation in a brawl as it 
progresses” (Jackson-Jacobs, 2004, p. 232). However, this essay analyzes one particular 
brawl, which the author did not witness, but was told about shortly afterwards in two 
interviews and one written account. Jackson-Jacobs also took one of the participants back to 
the site of the brawl four years later to tape-record the fighter‟s recollection of the event. In 
analyzing the experiences of three individuals who fought and lost in the encounter, 
Jackson-Jacobs‟ central argument is that brawlers fight in order to illicit dramatic and 
entertaining narrative accounts that allow them to build reputations as charismatic, exciting, 
and tough figures. In his words, “Fighters intend their brawls to make good stories that 
reveal themselves as charismatic. And so they enact storylines that they expect will both 
test their character and be applauded by audiences” (Jackson-Jacobs, 2004, p. 232). 
   Similar to Denzin (1984), Jackson-Jacobs (2004) uses his participants‟ stories to 
document the typical stages a fight passes through: entering a public space, staging a 
character context, fighting, and telling the story of the fight. Among these stages, the most Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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important for fighters‟ intentional projects are the character contest and the narrative 
reconstruction. Jackson-Jacobs‟ “dramaturgical phenomenology” focuses on these two 
stages and the importance of the presentation of self in the character contest. The character 
contest is, according to Jackson-Jacobs, an effort to construct a favorable narrative of the 
fight regardless of the future outcome.  
Jackson-Jacobs (2004) argues that “shit talking” is an important element of the 
interactive character contest. In this process, actors verbally attempt to provoke another 
person to fight while simultaneously attempting to present themselves as charismatic and 
tough men to the audience watching the interaction. This interaction is the process whereby 
participants constitute the experience as violent. Jackson-Jacob argues that “shit talking” 
structures the experience as violent by: (i) signaling the potentiality of violence, (ii) enticing 
the object of verbal aggression to strike, (iii) moving the body into the emotions needed to 
erupt violently, and (iv) providing a memorable narrative that participants can reconstruct 
more easily than the physical altercation itself. Once this character contest becomes 
physical, Jackson-Jacobs argues that the men involved escalate the level of violence in an 
attempt to save face and appear as the more hegemonic figure. Others‟ experience of street 
fighting is, for Jackson-Jacobs, thus phenomenologically understood as an intentional action 
aimed at building a masculine reputation.  
Katz, Lyng, and Staudigl: Violence as existential, embodied experience   
Denzin (1984) and Jackson-Jacobs (2004) focus on the interactive meaning-
constitution of violent experience as a rationally calculated performance. In so doing, their 
accounts fit most readily within Husserl‟s and Schutz‟s work. In contrast, Jack Katz, (1988), 
Stephen Lyng (2004) and Michael Staudigl (2007) stress the embodied features of violent 
experience.  
Katz‟s (1988) effort to connect phenomenology and criminology demonstrates the 
seductive emotional content that inheres within various criminal transgressions. Like Denzin 
(1984), Katz (1988) argues violent actors use physical force to respond to actions they feel Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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are humiliating. Violence is thus an attempt to reassert a particular identity. However, Katz 
more clearly demonstrates that the emotional and experiential features of the violent act 
itself serve as a motive for the violent actor. The rage and pre-reflexive embodiment 
involved in violent action demonstrates a transcendent personality that refuses to kneel to 
reason or context. Reflecting Heidegger‟s (1962) existential phenomenology, Katz argues 
that the hardened violent actor orients himself existentially to a transcendent bad-ass 
identity (see Polizzi, 2010).   
Lyng‟s (2004) work is an attempt to provide a “criminology of the skin” that 
discusses crime as an embodied practice and does not over-emphasize its rational 
motivations (see Ferrell & Sanders, 1995, p. 316). Lyng‟s (2004, p. 364) overall project 
explores “the ontological status of embodied consciousness.” In this particular essay he 
draws parallels between criminal activities and his research on voluntary risk-taking, or 
what he calls “edgework.” He argues that crime is a seductive form of edgework because, 
like high-risk sports, it frequently pushes the body into the pre-reflexive and ambiguous 
realm. Within this realm, notions of linear time and Euclidean space collapse while “the 
„voice of society‟ is silenced and the „me‟ is annihilated. What is left in place of these 
elements is a residual, „acting‟ self that responds without reflective consciousness” (Lyng, 
2004, p. 362). The extraordinary character of this experience, argues Lyng, makes it 
seductive. He argues that persons‟ bodies are increasingly attracted to the erotic sensuality 
of edgework because late capitalism‟s monotonous tasks disembody our everyday 
lifeworlds. 
Lyng (2004) is quick to point out, however, that our responses to this 
disembodiment must negotiate the fact that our bodies are susceptible to illness, injury, or 
death, and are therefore contingent, vulnerable, and unpredictable. In part, this uncertainty 
is what makes reasserting embodiment through edgework so appealing; by pushing our 
bodies to the limit to re-embody ourselves, we are literally living on the edge of existence. 
Lyng argues there are four typical ways we respond to disembodiment and negotiate bodily Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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contingency. Among these is the “dominating body” as a violent response. According to 
Lyng, dominating bodies fear their own contingency, yet seek this in others. “[T]he 
dominating body is actually attracted to the contingency of the other because terminating 
other-contingency is the means by which it extinguishes its own indeterminacy” (Lyng, 
2004, p. 369). In dominating others, violent bodies disguise their own objective uncertainty 
and extinguish all forms of intersubjective understanding that place limits on the self. This 
experience, according to Lyng (2004, p, 369), creates a transcendent reality that “consists 
of an extreme subjectivity that is maintained by drawing on the body‟s contingent power to 
create havoc.” In dominating others, the body becomes not an object, but a “becoming-
body,” “consumed by its own capacity for chaos” (Lyng, 2004, p. 370).  
  Staudigl (2007) deals even more explicitly with the theme of violence in his attempt 
to build a phenomenological theory. He sees “the methodological center of phenomenology 
as the attempt to purely describe our experiences of objective givens in terms of the ways 
we make sense of them” (Staudigl, 2007: 233-234). He does not reference any data from 
persons who have experienced violence; rather his arguments involve self-reflections even 
though he is not clear on the extent to which he has experienced violence.  
  Staudigl‟s (2007) theorization adopts elements of both Merleau-Ponty and Schutz.  
Staudigl draws on Merleau-Ponty to argue that our embodiment structures our 
understanding of the world and leads us to form pre-reflexive habits. He conceives of our 
relation to the world as one of “I can” whereby we intend certain physical actions and decide 
among particular pragmatic projects. However, like Lyng (2004), Staudigl (2007) argues 
that our embodied selves have an inherent vulnerability that we must negotiate in 
determining our intentional projects. According to Staudigl (2007. P. 240), violence destroys 
our “bodily “I can,” its collective forms, and the sense structures founded upon them.” It is 
a restriction of the “I can” because, using the terminology of Schutz, it limits the 
“relevancies” that persons can consider in creating intentional pragmatic projects (Staudigl, 
2007, p. 244). Further reflecting Schutz, Staudigl utilizes conceptions of cognitive Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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intentional and motive to argue that violent actors consciously aim to destroy 
intersubjectivity by inflicting pain on the body of the other. Violence closes victims‟ 
intentional openness to the world and forces them consider a body typically taken for 
granted in immersed activity. Violence demands that the victim intentionally orient him or 
herself toward only one course of action: that which ends the violence and guarantees their 
continued bodily existence (Staudigl, 2007, p. 240).  
The loss of the body‟s “I can” is not simply a reduction in one‟s physical function, but 
also a loss of one‟s ability to make sense of the world since the body is central to sense-
making. That is, like Denzin (1984), Staudigl (2007) concludes that violence ruptures our 
existing interpretive frameworks. With this conception of violence as a restriction of 
intentional projects, Staudigl (2007, p. 245) argues that all victims experience violence as a 
social “contraction of the basic reciprocity of perspectives which reduces interaction to an 
asymmetrically determined relation.”  
Conclusions from review: “Imperialism of the same” as a methodological problem 
These phenomenologies are remarkably different from the reflections on 
consciousness that appear in the philosophical accounts of phenomenology. With the 
apparent exceptions of Staudigl (2007) and Lyng (2004), these scholars take other‟s 
experience as their primary data and do not operate within the strict confines of a 
phenomenological epoché that focuses on self-reflection. We might take this as a clue to the 
tension between the philosophical phenomenological project and social science‟s aim to 
describe and analyze the lived world of others (see Best, 1975; Pivcevic, 1972).  None of 
these studies attempts to bracket out consideration of all other factors and consider what, if 
anything, violence is in and of itself. This, I argue, demonstrates (i) that pure description is 
seldom the aim of social science and (ii) that it is extremely difficult to single out an object 
as an item of reflection when it is not immediately before us. Authors like Denzin (1984) are 
correct to assume that violence occurs in cultural contexts that influence how, where, and 
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cannot consider these external factors of experience. That the authors do not fully employ 
the phenomenological epoché confirms the general phenomenological conclusion that self-
conscious reflection cannot directly access others‟ experiences.  
Intersubjectively remains both a central theme and problem in these analyses of 
violence. Each scholar holds the phenomenological conclusion that the shared or subjective-
existential meaning of violence is co-created interactionally. Theoretically we see this 
conclusion in testaments that individuals complete their violent projects (i) by using the 
other as the foil for their attempts to engage in pre-reflexive embodied action (Lyng, 2004; 
Katz, 1988; Staudigl, 2007), (ii) by responding to victims‟ apparent challenges to their 
desired identities (Denzin, 1984; Katz, 1988), or (iii) by imaging audiences‟ interpretations 
of their actions (Jackson-Jacobs, 2004). Uniquely, we find that although violence is 
intersubjectively constituted and enacted, its meaning is frequently conceptualized as an 
activity that restricts intersubjective meaning and imposes the violent actors‟ unilateral 
interpretation (Staudigl, 2007; Denzin, 1984; Katz, 1988). These conclusions are insightful, 
yet the major difficulty here is that it is unclear how the phenomenological premise of 
intersubjective meaning-constitution is reflected in each authors‟ methodology. How are 
these conclusions arrived at? If an understanding of events is constituted intersubjectively, 
how is the researcher in each of these analyses privy to that interactionally-constituted 
meaning?  
The answers to these questions are unclear. Staudigl (2007, p. 248) proclaims that 
“[i]n order to avoid mystifying explanations, violence must not be reified or essentialized, 
but has to be accounted for from the (inter)acting subject‟s point of view,” yet his analysis 
does not make use of anyone else‟s view on the matter. Lyng (2004) is similarly opaque 
about how he experienced crime and violence or how he accessed others who had such 
experiences. Katz (1988) draws on secondary data to conclude that the act of violence is 
itself the central motive for violent actors who existentially desire to be bad-asses. Denzin 
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two interviews that were potentially his own. Jackson-Jacobs (2004) interacts with his 
interviewees, but largely fails to demonstrate how his conclusions about violent others are 
informed by those others‟ experiences. For instance, although “shit talking” is central to his 
argument that violent actors aim to construct favorable narrative accounts, he does not 
integrate any dialogue from his interviewees to demonstrate this process or confirm that 
they view their actions along these lines.  
Without significantly demonstrating their direct participation with others, the authors 
are left to reconstruct the intersubjective meaning of violence on their own terms. This 
makes it difficult to differentiate the researchers‟ interpretations, from those of the 
participants, or from those co-constructed between researcher and participant. All authors 
claim that they are conveying the experience as understood by those involved in violent 
actions, yet their approach leaves room for their interpretation of the experience to replace 
that of the other. Of course, Schutz (1967, p. 223) sees this as a necessary scholarly 
practice – social science, being a practice involving contemporaries or predecessors, must 
rely on inferential process, indirect analysis, and ideal types.  This is precisely the route 
these scholars take. Each author develops some sort of ideal-typical model that they 
contend captures any violent experience. Denzin (1984) and Jackson-Jacobs (2004) provide 
accounts of the stages of violence that all experience. Lyng (2004) develops a typology of 
all bodily reactions to disembodiment. Staudigl (2007) draws on Schutz‟s belief that we can 
know the typical “relevancies” persons will/must consider in interpersonal exchange. Katz 
(1988) posits – as Schutz (1967, p. 130, 190) demonstrates one must when not in direct 
contact with participants – a personal ideal type that assumes that the completed action 
(violent crime) is itself the in-order-to motive of the participant. Although these typical 
models might be useful heuristic tools, they interestingly do not contain a category of 
“other” that might allow for different experiences that remain inaccessible to the researcher. 
In fact, since these authors develop an all-encompassing interpretative rubric of violent 
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phenomenological authors, like Denzin (1984, p. 487 – emphasis added), who assert that 
“meanings are filtered and woven through the lives of interacting individuals, each of whom 
is understood to be a universal singular.”  
Insomuch as these analyses claim to fully capture every others‟ experience of 
violence, we could charge these phenomenologies of violence with supporting an 
“imperialism of the same” and ignoring the alterity of “the other.” How the interpretations 
and typologies set forth reflect and respect others‟ experience is never clearly stated by the 
authors. We are left with an understanding of violent experience that appears to be made 
primarily by the author, not the other.   
Indeed, Schutz (1967, p. 205), despite seeing ideal-typical analysis as central to 
social science, explicitly stated that such analysis risked replacing the other‟s experience 
with that of the analyst.  
Observation of the social behaviour of another involves the very real danger that the 
observer will naively substitute his own ideal types for those his subject. The danger 
becomes more acute when the observer, instead of being directly attentive to the 
person observed, thinks of the latter as a “case history” of such and such an 
abstractly defined type of conduct. Here not only may the observer be using the 
wrong ideal type to understand his subject‟s behaviour, but he may never discover 
his error because he never confronts his subject as a real person.  
 
Although Schutz (1967) felt that indirect observation was the proper purview of social 
science, he sowed the seeds of his own critique because he was not clear how forcing ideal-
types to be consistent with scientific conclusions would save these ideal-typical analyses 
from substituting the analysts view for that of the participant. On the one hand, he explicitly 
placed direct participatory face-to-face relationships as the basis of knowledge (see Walsh, 
1967). On the other hand, he held that scientific knowledge, which was allegedly never 
directly acquired from others, could ensure meaning-adequacy by generalizing from the 
researcher‟s past experience (Schutz, 1967, ch. 5). This inferential scientific thought 
process, however, seems to slide away from “being directly attentive to the person 
observed” and thus possesses the same “very real danger that the observer will naively Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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substitute his own ideal types for those of his subject” (Schutz, 1967, p. 205). More 
damaging, it is not clear why Schutz (1967), having prioritized knowledge gained through 
direct participation, excludes those research methods that utilized these relationships from 
the realm of proper social science. Indeed, under the auspices of phenomenology, 
understanding others seems to demand involvement with them. Unfortunately, the above 
phenomenolgies of violence are unclear as to how each researcher is implicated 
intersubjectively in the meaning attributed to others.  
Consequently, the authors frequently confuse whose subjective understanding is 
actually being presented. Understandings of one actor are replaced by those of the author 
or other actors, dissolving the potentially alternative accounts of those ignored or spoken 
for. For example, Jackson-Jacobs (2004) uses the reconstructed account of someone who 
was not the instigator of fight to discuss how an actor interactionally generates a fight. At a 
minimum, if he wants to claim that he captures the understanding of the instigator, 
Jackson-Jacobs ought to demonstrate how the third party‟s interpretation is likely an 
accurate reflection of the initial actor‟s. Similarly, Denzin (1984) largely uses evidence 
integrated from studies of victimized wives to discuss how violent actors understand the 
encounter and how the meaning of violence is co-constructed. In fact, although each study 
claims to capture the intersubjective experience of violence, each account actually tends 
toward viewing violence from either the perpetrators‟ or victims‟ perspectives. In Jackson-
Jacobs (2004), Lyng (2004), Katz (1988), and Denzin (1984), the suggestion that 
individuals derive satisfaction from violence demonstrates that they are only describing 
batterers‟ experiences. The fact that persons might be both perpetrators and victims in the 
same altercation only highlights their failure to capture participants‟ full experience; these 
authors devote few words to describing what receiving violence is like. Staudigl‟s (2007) 
account of contingency and restriction, on the other hand, focuses on victims‟ experience. 
Here too, however, he does not integrate the particulars of victims‟ experiences and so 
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contingent and unpredictable, for instance, does not consider that there are levels of bodily 
contingency. An athlete is unlikely to feel that his or her body is as contingent and 
unpredictable as a quadriplegic with chronic muscle spasms or an arthritic whose pain levels 
vary according to something as erratic as the weather. Finally, the assertion in all five 
studies that violence ruptures people‟s everyday worlds overlooks the likelihood that for 
some unfortunate people violence is a normalized aspect of their day-to-day lives.  
In an effort to posit a stable understanding of how others experience violence these 
phenomenologies of violence also deny alterity insomuch as they overlook how temporality 
continually creates different understandings. The temporal nature of all experience and 
understanding is a central concept for each of the above philosophers but does not figure 
prominently in these accounts where the methodology does not embed the researcher in the 
unfolding and never-completed flow of participants‟ experiences.  
Jackson-Jacobs (2004) and Katz (1988) provide the most lucid examples of this 
oversight. All the accounts used by Jackson-Jacobs (2004) are recollections of the event. He 
claims that persons go into fights with a cognitive intentionality that aims at presenting 
themselves as masculine heroes standing up to challenges bigger than them. But this claim 
fails to consider that the accounts he analyzes are oriented by intentional acts that grasp 
the brawl as an already-completed (and failed) project. In fact, the temporal nature of 
understanding reveals itself in Jackson-Jacobs‟ (2004) contradictory claims that, on the one 
hand, no one can ever know the outcome of a fight until it is over, and on the other hand, 
the brawlers he talked to knew they would lose. To take the heroic underdog narrative 
created after-the-fact and recast it as the motive orienting fighters before the encounter is 
unjustified unless verified by the participants themselves before the act. If the fighters had 
won the brawl, Jackson-Jacobs (2004) would have heard radically different accounts and 
would have had to presumably present a different motive as guiding the fighters. A different 
outcome would significantly change the fighters‟ understandings and would curtail Jackson-
Jacobs (2004, p. 231) claims that the possibility of generating stories motivates fighters Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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“more so than the physical risks and appeals.” Katz (1988) likewise overlooks how 
temporality determines his analysis. Katz abstracts the criminal act from the ongoing 
temporal experience of the actor and then projects the act back in time as the motivation 
for the crime. Consequently, the process becomes tautological (see Schutz, 1967, ch. 4). 
Although the criminal event itself might play a role in orienting the bad-ass, if we looked 
past the completion of the act we might find that a person completed the act less for its own 
sake than for the bragging rights that come with completion, as Jackson-Jacobs (2004) 
suggests. While Katz (1988) brilliantly defends his focus on theoretical grounds, his choice 
is also necessitated by the data he analyzes and the indirect relationship he has with those 
he seeks to explain. Without data that captures a larger duration of the temporal experience 
of others, the analysts is forced to abstract a moment from the flow of experience and posit 
it as the primarily meaningful act.  
As Schutz (1967, p. 65) reflected, “The meaning of an action is different depending 
on the point in time from which it is observed.” He further cautioned, but ultimately failed to 
reconcile, that, in any experience: 
[e]ach component stage can be regarded as a new unity. It is up to the observer, be 
he the actor‟s partner or a sociologist, to decide arbitrarily where the total act begins 
and ends. The paradox is insoluble. Of what use is it to talk about the intended 
meaning of an action if one ignores that phase of the action which is relevant to the 
actor and situates for it as the interpretation an arbitrarily chosen segment of the 
observed performance – “the facts”? (Schutz, 1967, p. 62)  
 
Over time, and with each temporal orientation, the activity one is concerned with contains a 
completely different subjective meaning for the acting person.  In these phenomenologies of 
violence the researchers suggest a co-constituted but nevertheless stable understanding of 
violence. This denies the ever-shifting and unfolding nature of phenomenon. The researcher 
must always be aware of these different and unfolding interpretations.  Each claim about 
how an individual experiences a phenomenon “requires a date index specifying the moment 
of the meaning-interpretation” and the temporal reference point of the individual (Schutz, 
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understanding of the others‟ experience could be achieved. Instead explicit reference to the 
temporal-situatedness of one‟s experience would remain true to phenomenological 
conclusions that demonstrate the open-endedness of meaning and the social world (see 
Schutz, 1967; Polizzi, 2010). Attention to temporality, then, would demand attention to 
difference and change as experienced by the participant. This focus would help protect 
against any attempt to replace the participants‟ unfolding understanding with the allegedly 
stable understanding of a detached researcher.  
  Engagement with participants could also aid in determining the specific form of 
intentionality – cognitive or practical – that guides their experience. All these studies 
maintain that perpetrators experience violent actions as intentional projects, although the 
degree to which one is cognitively aware of what he or she intends varies. Demonstrating 
the form of intentionality, however, remains a difficulty for each of the above authors. 
Although Jackson-Jacobs (2004) and Denzin (1984) provide the strongest emphasis on the 
cognitive intentionality of violent actors, they do not, as we have already discussed, provide 
evidence that prior to its occurrence participants experience violence as a consciously 
pursued goal. A similar problem strikes Lyng (2004) and Satudigl (2007), who stress 
practical intentionally and the unreflective embodied responses of violent actors. If 
embodied actions are pre-reflexive, how, then, could we assert that a person‟s violence 
intends toward the enchantment found in dissolving the distinction between self and world? 
By virtue of the action being pre-reflexive, another individual could not convey his or her 
experience to another individual at the moment violence erupts. How can Lyng (2004) or 
Staudigl (2007) arrive at conclusions about the embodied experience of violence without 
converting certain behaviours of the other into clues of embodied practices or without going 
through the embodied experiences themselves? How can any of these auhtors verify that 
either cognitive or practical intentionality drives actors without connecting themselves to 
those actors? Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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  Interestingly, despite the fact that some of these authors stress that violence 
involves embodied, practical intentionality and blurred self-other distinctions, none report 
participating in violence alongside others in an embodied fashion. Rather, from mainly 
indirect encounters, they form conclusions about others‟ experiences. As such, clear 
distinctions between self (researcher) and other remain in their work. Indeed, in most cases 
the author‟s own work operates within the confines of a cognitive intentionality where 
actions of the other are taken as, or reduced to, a representation of some larger project 
(see Dreyfus, 1993; Schutz, 1967), without confirmation by the other that this project is in 
fact the aim or desire. One might suggest, then, that these authors orient toward the other 
with a cognitive intentionality that, like their violent actors, reduces the other to their own 
end as they aim to impart an understanding on the other‟s actions.  
All these critiques considered, then, we could conclude that these phenomenological 
applications do not sufficiently account for differences in the experience of violence. In 
many cases it appears as though it is the researcher‟s interpretation that prevails over that 
of the other. Perhaps the greatest irony in this is that since these studies restrict the 
possible experiences of others by reducing them to a particular coherent account develop 
mainly by the author, they are, according to Staudigl‟s (2007), Lyng‟s (2004), and Denzin‟s 
(1984) vision of violence as restricting an intending person, themselves violent. In fact, 
restricting “the other” by representing their experience in one‟s own terms is exactly the 
violence that Levinas (1985) deplores and accuses phenomenology of (see Reynolds, 2004; 
Dutta, 2004).  
Beyond violence: Sharing as ethics and research practice  
Critique of others as wholly-other 
  This conclusion, however, should not lead us to reject all phenomenological insights. 
Nor should it cause us, like Levinas (1985), to assert that the only proper task is to 
venerate others‟ complete alterity. Problems definitely arise when phenomenologists claims 
to capture others‟ experiences based on solitary reflection without demonstrating the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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intersubjective nature of this reflection. However, to assert that the other cannot be known 
“verges on becoming “agnosticism” in regard to the other” (Reynolds, 2004, p. xvii). Such 
agnosticism does not assist us in our quest to determine how we can understand others‟ 
experiences. In fact, it asserts that this quest is impossible. The problem here, as Reynolds 
(2004) points out, is if we cannot know the other in any fashion, then the solipsism that 
critics (inaccurately) attribute to phenomenology actually  “seems to have returned through 
the back door” (p. 137).  
  In truth, the phenomenological conclusion that we experience and share a world with 
others does not necessitate that we must, or can, know those others in their entirety 
without any remaining difference. While eidetic analysis and reliance on ideal-types and 
typologies might post an essentialized coherent understanding of others, these do not have 
to be the core features of a phenomenology. In fact, these analytical tools arguably reflect 
Husserl‟s (1982) and Schutz‟s (1967) efforts to find secure foundations for science more 
than they reflect necessary elements of phenomenological analysis (see Marion, 1998; 
Heidegger, 1962). Phenomenology often demonstrates the partiality of knowledge and so 
leaves space for difference without assuming an unbridgeable gap between self and other. 
In particular, Merleau-Ponty‟s ideas of ambiguity and intertwining rail against accounts of 
the other as completely the same or as wholly-other (Reynolds, 2004).  In The Visible and 
the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty argues claims that we cannot know the other amount to a 
negative positivism that ignores the complexity of human experience. As he eloquently 
writes, “a negativist thought is identical to a positivist thought, and in this reversal remains 
the same in that, whether considering the void of nothingness or the absolute fullness of 
being, it in every case ignores density, depth, the plurality of planes, the background 
worlds” (p. 68 – quoted in Reynolds, 2004, p. 121).  
Claims that the other is inaccessible seem to accept that apodictic self-awareness is 
the standard of knowledge. Allegedly, since we cannot know another‟s consciousness, we 
cannot know the other. This account holds a split between mind and body, and self and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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other, wherein we apparently only find true selves within the mind and not on the visible 
actions of bodies or within pre-reflexive responses to one another. Levinas (1969,1985) 
account of the other as wholly-other is correct, then, only if we (i) think of the other as 
completely distinct from one‟s self, and (ii) maintain that the other‟s true self is contained 
within the inaccessible mind. Levinas‟ position thus seemingly adopts a strict cognitive 
intentionality and is too Cartesian and too absolutist.  
Phenomenological possibilities for understanding others 
As suggested in my review of the phenomenologies of violence, I argue that we can 
use some phenomenological insights, particularly Merleau-Ponty‟s, to sketch a research 
program of how to understand others without reducing the other‟s experience to our own, 
as the above phenomenologies of violence seem to do. I further argue that Merleau-Ponty‟s 
philosophy allows us to escape any “agnosticism toward the other” (Reynolds, 2004) that 
stems from assuming the other‟s experiences are completely different, as Levinas‟s (1969, 
1985) position and similar “ethics of alterity” seem to do (Couzens-Hoy, 2005). This entails 
accepting Merleau-Ponty‟s position on intertwining and ambiguity, while retaining a number 
of other conclusions shared among phenomenological descriptions of experience.  
Foremost among the phenomenological conclusions that we must start with is the 
conclusion of Merleau-Ponty (2002), Husserl (1982), Heidegger (1962), and Schutz (1967), 
that conscious reflection demonstrates we share a world with other beings. Because we 
share a world with others we can, on the basis of this sharing, make efforts to understand 
them. We must couple this position on sharing, however, with Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002, 2004) 
conclusions about intertwining and ambiguity. These concepts demonstrate that we are 
never fully aware of our selves or others. Thus expecting to have absolute clarity in our 
experience of “the other” is absurd; there are degrees of understanding such that some 
components of the other are accessible to us and others are not (Reynolds, 2004). Merleau-
Ponty‟s philosophy demonstrates that our bodily experience rejects understanding objects or 
others according to a dichotomy of presence or absence, similarity or difference, self or Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
2011 Special Edition Vol. 1: 1-42     
33 
 
other. The final phenomenological conclusion we should carry with us – one that is 
confirmed from Husserl onward – is that understanding unfolds as a temporal experience. 
This suggests that our understandings of others must involve longitudinal efforts. Although 
we might not understand another person at one moment, we can, overtime, gain a partial 
understanding of them by sharing in their experiences. Understanding is a process of 
learning entailing anticipation, experience, fulfillment, and revision. 
As an ethics  
  Starting from a position that we daily engage in “we-relationships” (Schutz, 1967) 
with other body-subjects (Merleau-Ponty, 2002) or beings-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1962) 
rallies against Levinas‟ (1969, 1985) “ethics of alterity” based on the other as wholly-other. 
In fact, as Merleau-Ponty (1968) argues, “agnosticism in regard to the other‟s being for 
himself, which appeared to guarantee his alterity, suddenly appears as the worst of 
infringements upon it” (p. 70 – quoted in Reynolds, 2004, p. 120). As Reynolds (2004) 
explains, “For Merleau-Ponty, a responsible treatment of alterity consists in recognizing that 
alterity is always intertwined with subjectivity, rather than obscuring this fact by 
projecting…an alterity that is inaccessible and beyond comprehension” (p. 137).  Merleau-
Ponty‟s position is about using our shared existence to engage in experiences of intertwining 
that alter understandings of self and other. “This ethic of mutual transformation is not an 
imperialism of the same, as the sanctity of the self must be breached in any meaningful 
interaction with alterity” (Reynolds, 2004, p. 138). Moreover, as separate embodied persons 
we cannot, and should not, expect to achieve an account of experience that completely 
corresponds with another person‟s. We are always in the position of viewing the world from 
our embodied perspective, and no matter how intensely bodies might come together, they 
can never occupy the same point and ensure themselves the same biography (Katz, 2002). 
As Reynolds (2004, p. 138) perceptively summarizes,  
We do not encounter difference by preserving it untouched, like a specimen in a jar. 
Rather, difference and alterity are truly experienced only through an openness that 
recognizes that despite all of the undoubted differences that we encounter, there is Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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always something shared that allows difference to be conceivable at all. This is not 
an effort to reintegrate difference into sameness, but an insistence on the 
importance of transforming the notions of self and other in any attempt to behave 
responsibly towards the alterity of the other.  
 
Unlike the “ethics of alterity” which would have us forever negotiating and awaiting the 
impossible arrival of the wholly-other (e.g., Derrida, 1995), an ethics that starts from the 
position that we share a world and experience others as both similar and different would 
have us work towards transformation and understanding with others.  
 Research as sharing, “being-with” others 
As alluded to in the above critical discussion of the phenomenologies of violence, 
working with a phenomenology that starts from conclusions about shared existence and 
recognizes others experience as both similar and different requires a particular 
methodological stance. To a large degree the above phenomeologies of violence ignored 
difference and contended that self-reflections could account for others‟ experiences. At the 
very least, these studies did not demonstrate that their conclusions resulted from sharing 
temporal experiences in the lifeworld of others. This criticism is not a polemic against 
researchers theorizing their material. Nor is it meant to deny the valuable contributions of 
these studies. Rather, it is a proclamation that our accounts about others‟ experiences 
ought to demonstrate that (i) we formed conclusions in partnership with research subjects, 
and (ii) despite working together in shared experience, elements of the experience remain 
unresolved, ambiguous, and different for the parties involved. These proclamations echo the 
properties of understanding revealed by Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002) phenomenology: it is 
intersubjectively formed by sharing a world with others over time, and it contains elements 
of similarity and difference and so is always partial.   
Understanding others‟ experiences, then, requires a research method that allows us 
to share experiences and work with others over time. Sharing experience, of course, occurs 
in multiple ways. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 413) documents that as we share the world we 
develop a shared language that helps us develop understanding and mutual cultural habits. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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However, our embodiment and pre-reflexivity ought to demonstrate that reducing 
experience to language limits our accounts (Katz, 2002; Long, 1979). Ethnographic 
involvement offers a potentially fuller, although never complete, picture of experience by 
tapping the extra-discursive. Husserl‟s (1982), Schutz‟s (1967), Heidegger‟s (1962) and 
Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002) phenomenologies show that understanding unfolds in relations, in 
verification between self and other. Ethnography inserts us into these relationships and, 
unlike textual analyses, which freeze the other‟s testimony in time, ethnography allows 
relationships and understanding to exhibit their temporal character. Moreover, it is only in 
participating in the worlds of others that we might ourselves experience Merleau-Ponty‟s 
(2002) idea of the intertwining of self and other that presents the ambiguity and fullness of 
shared experience. Of course, texts are required to represent many experiences. However, 
when such texts are used, they ought to elicit deep narratives, and analysts ought to focus 
on the particularities and ambiguities that these narratives convey (Katz, 2002).  
Ideally, we would try as much as possible to share the lifeworld of others; to work 
with them toward partial understanding and transformation of both self and research 
subject. This transformative element does not require “going native” and reducing the self 
to the same as the other, but it does require a constant reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher. This reflexivity would display the output of research to be a co-production 
achieved through a partial intertwining of researcher and participants. It would document 
the (not-necessarily-equivalent) changes in the researcher and subjects while highlighting 
the remaining differences among parties. Indeed, theoretical explanations would primarily 
aim to provide multiple accounts of these differences. As Katz (2002, p. 260) declares, 
explanation “is always an attempt to understand difference.” We must share in the world of 
others to describe that world and the different experiences persons have of it, and then use 
those differences to form our theoretical reflections. Phenomenological description can 
document what we share, while theory can explain differences within that shared world and Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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recognize those differences as “nevertheless a coherent and conceivable mode of existence” 
(Reynolds, 2004, p. 145).  
The research process I am advocating here is, therefore, about “being-with” others 
and working together toward partial understanding that respects difference. This is not 
something completely foreign. A considerable amount of formidable criminological 
scholarship has proceeded without formal and strict methodological principles, opting 
instead to simply live among those researched (Ferrell, 2009). Moreover, as Katz (2002) 
argues, we already have programs to deal with the possibility of non-understanding in our 
daily lives. We need to treat “the other” as we do the “significant others” that we work with 
daily to achieve understanding. We need to make the processes of our everyday lives not 
only the topic of investigation, but also the guidelines for method. As Schutz (1967, p. 171) 
initially noted, we must engage with others to understand their experience: talking with 
them and giving them the opportunity to verify our interpretations of their aims, 
embodiment, reflections, and absorbed actions.  We must hear their stories (e.g., Polizzi, 
2010) and experience what their bodies do to the best of our abilities (e.g., Ferrell, 2006). 
We must allow others to verify and change our understanding, and we must remain forever 
cognizant that significant differences remain between us and others despite this living 
together and interaction. In short, to understand others‟ experiences, we must share in 
those experiences.  
The experience of sharing (and its nuances)  
  I am certainly not the first to advocate for embedded research methodologies like 
ethnography. Cultural criminologists have made similar insights (see Ferrell, 2004, 2007). 
Jeff Ferrell‟s (1997) Weberian-inspired approach, in particular, argues embedded participant 
observation that taps the immediate embodied experience of transgression is necessary to 
adequate criminological verstehen. I follow this tradition; however, underpinning 
criminological research practices with the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (2002, 2004) more 
strongly emphasizes ambiguity and remaining differences. If criminologist rely strictly on Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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Weber to make the case for sympathetic understanding and immersion (Ferrell, 1997), they 
risk thinking they can fully “become the subject matter” (Ferrell, 2007) or risk slipping – as 
Schutz (1964, 1967, 1971) and the above phenomenologists of violence did – into ideal-
typical analyses. These approaches usually ignore remaining differences and place less 
emphasis on temporal change, ambiguity, intertwining, and mutual transformation.    
A brief phenomenologically-inspired reflection on the experience of sharing perhaps 
best demonstrates the central features and nuances of the approach that I am advocating. 
When sharing occurs, people meet over something they agree exists and is worth while. 
Persons then take parts of this shared object into their own experience, but these parts 
cannot be the same and individual experiences of each part might be wildly different. 
Sharing thus involves working together through similarity and difference. For instance, we 
cannot share the same bite of pie, and our experiences of the pie might be different; 
nevertheless, by sharing the experience we are in a better position to work out a description 
and explanation of the differences than if we ate entirely different pies. Sharing something 
is not reducing it to the same. Moreover, the act of sharing transforms both the object 
shared and the persons involved. While sharing, neither party can claim ownership to the 
object nor lay full claim to its essence.  
Criminology, however, is not as “easy as pie”; criminologists are oftentimes 
concerned with understanding people and things that are far less pleasant, things like 
violence. The same guidelines for understanding nonetheless apply. To understand violent 
others we would do best to venture into a shared lifeworld with them. We would have to 
take up the fight and document how we are transformed with others (e.g., Wacquant, 
2004), which could very well mean we would have to push the boundaries of ethics and 
legality to gain a sense of the embodied experience and when persons are operating with 
cognitive intentionality or practical intentionality (see Ferrell, 1997). Nevertheless, in 
entering a specific violent lifeworld, we must remain cognizant of the fact that our 
embodiment, social position, and personal biography mean that we could never experience Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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violence in exactly the same way as others. These differences must be respected and must 
become the subject of theorization and explanation (Katz, 2002). To hash out these 
difference and make sense of them, however, we must share our experiences with others – 
first sharing in others‟ daily routines, and then sharing our experiences of that lifeworld with 
those others to illuminate differences.   
Conclusion: From Violence toward Sharing  
  This paper began with the question: What, if anything, can phenomenology offer 
criminology‟s understanding of others? In responding to this question, I considered 
phenomeology‟s relation to violence. My discussion moved from violence toward sharing. I 
did this is two senses. First, in making my argument, I considered a phenomenology of 
violence and then a phenomenology of sharing. Second, I argued that using a 
phenomenology inspired by Merleau-Ponty we can move from a violent understanding of 
others that dissolves their alterity toward an understanding built on the practice of sharing 
lifeworlds. This approach accounts for both similarity and difference in our attempt to 
understand others. It avoids the overstatement of difference found in accounts of others as 
wholly-other and inaccessible. As an ethical practice, this approach encourages mutual 
transformation and acceptance that difference is necessary. As a research practice, it 
encourages (i) sharing experiences with others in an ethnographic attempt to work toward 
partial understanding, (ii) reflexivity about mutual transformation, and (iii) theoretical 
accounts that explain and respect differences. My overall conclusion is that although some 
phenomenological analyses might dissolve alterity by replacing others‟ experiences with 
those of the analyst, this is not a necessary outcome of phenomenological reflection. 
Rather, it is largely a consequence of misaligned methodologies and a (misguided) 
continued quest for apodictic certainty in social research. Many phenomenological 
conclusions remain good starting points for criminological research. By coupling conclusions 
about the shared lifeworld and the temporality of experience with Merleau-Ponty‟s (2002, 
2004) ideas about the ambiguity of perception and intertwining of body-subjects, we can Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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have a phenomenology that demonstrates the uncertainty we live in with others, never 
completely sure of who they are or how they experience, but, under a principle of sharing, 
trudging forward with them nonetheless.  Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Freistadt 
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